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Justice Murphy: The Freshman Years
Woodford Howard*
Justice Murphy is commonly regarded as having been a libertarian
activist. He was not highly regarded as a Justice during his lifetime and
this opinion prevails today. Here Professor Howard sees Justice Murphy
during his early years on the Supreme Court as a man of indecision
rather than an uncompromising libertarian. Through an examination
of first amendment cases between 1940-42, the author finds that Murphy
displayed a common reaction to the responsibilities of a new Supreme
Court Justice which differed from most only in intensity.
I.
Since his death in 1949, Justice Frank Murphy has come to occupy
a discrete and not altogether flattering place in Supreme Court his-
tory. While a hero of a libertarian minority who revere the Court
more for its literature than for its law, Murphy is one of the few
Justices whose performance on the bench lowered rather than elevated
his public stature. Decision after decision which he opposed in the
1940's have since fallen under the Warren Court's preoccupation
with individual rights; controversy after controversy have since flared
over ideological values among the Justices, as well as over methods
of analysis among scholars outside; but seldom do contemporary
judges cite his opinions for support, and in scholarly literature, he
stands mainly as a prime exhibit of the vagaries of an eccentric judge.
The truth is that Murphy, in dominant professional opinion, was
regarded as a "weak sister" in his lifetime and remains so today.'
The reasons for his low professional repute are not hard to find.
Irrespective whether the analysis proceeds by reading cases or by"scientific" measurements, the Murphy of customary portrayals was
a Justice with a one-tracked mind. Competing social interests, whether
they be federalism, social order, or the Court's own limitations in a
diffused political system, were all subordinate to his passion for
individual liberty and the mercy for underdogs which undoubtedly
were his absorbing juridical concerns. The most extreme "libertarian
activist" in living memory, so the analysis goes, Murphy was essen-
* Assistant Professor of Political Science, Duke University.
1. MASON, HARLAN FisKE STONE: PILLAR OF THE LAW 793 (1956). See, e.g.,
Kurland, Book Review, 22 U. Cm. L. REv. 297, 299 (1954).
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tially a "lawless" natural justice judge whose vote was as predictable
as his impassioned pen. The "McReynolds of the left," a man who
thought "with his heart rather than his head," the Justice commonly
has been pictured by his critics as a man who followed militantly
liberal predilections without faltering-and without thought-from
his first day on the Court to his last.2 Of all modern Justices, none
has come closer to being considered a left-wing automaton.
Whatever one's view of the Justice-and either encomium or pane-
gyric would be irrelevant here-this customary portrait is considerably
overdrawn. Contrary to accumulated myths, Murphy did not estab-
lish himself immediately as a libertarian firebrand on the Supreme
Court. His initial impact on the development of law was ambivalent.
Though he was determined, as he told President Roosevelt after his
first day on the bench, "to give the best that is in me-to serve with
credit to my country and yourself," probably no other Justice in this
century began more aware of "how inadequate are the abilities that
I bring to this work" or more disquieted by the great changes of
status and function which appointment to the high tribunal invariably
entails.3 The early Murphy, accordingly, was almost the reverse of
contemporary appraisals. Rather than a willful judge who was too
ideologically-committed or too simple-minded to appreciate the com-
plexities of the judicial process, he was a self-conscious freshman,
restless over the personal and professional restraints of his new post,
and diffident to the point of indecisiveness in exercising its responsi-
bilities. Equivocation, not activism, was his primary trait.
The Justice's reaction was abnormal only in its intensity. Histori-
cally, a season of adjustment has been found necessary by virtually
every new Justice, regardless of era or of prior occupation, before he
became a fully effective member of the Court. Particularly since the
Civil War, new Justices have attested with singular uniformity to the
great personal and professional changes they have been called upon
2. Pnrrcnrr, CivrI LranRnms AND m ViNsoN Courn 190-92 (1954); ScuuBMrT,
QuANrrATnW ANALYSis OF Junicr. BmAvoR 339-42 (1959); Mendelson, The Neo-
Behavorial Approach to the Judicial Process, 57 Aam. POL. Sci. REV. 593, 596 (1963).
Roche, The Utopian Pilgrimage of Mr. Justice Murphy, 10 VANm. L. REv. 369 (1957);
Rodell, The Progressive, Oct. 4, 1943. For general appraisals of the Justice's work, see
articles in memorial issue, 48 MrcH. L. REv. 737-810 (1950); Barnett, Mr. Justice
Murphy, Civil Liberties and the Holmes Tradition, 32 CoRnrLL L.Q. 177 (1946);
Fahy, The Judicial Philosophy of Mr. Justice Murphy, 60 YALE L.J. 812 (1951);
Frank, Justice Murphy: The Goals Attempted, 59 YALE L.J. 1 (1949); Gressman, Mr.
Justice Murphy-A Preliminary Appraisal, 50 CoLum. L. REv. 29 (1950); Gressman,
The Controversial Image of Mr. Justice Murphy, 47 GEo. L.J. 631 (1959); Man, Mr.
Justice Murphy and the Supreme Court, 36 VA. L. Rnv. 889 (1950).
3. Letter From Frank Murphy [hereinafter referred to as FM] to Franklin D.
Roosevelt [hereinafter referred to as FDR], Feb. 5, 1940, Box 88, Murphy Papers,
the Michigan Historical Collections of the University of Michigan [unless otherwise
indicated, all correspondence cited here is drawn from this source].
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to make. In the first place, the proprieties of the office, coupled with
an always surprising work load, have usually, though not always,
compelled a personal discipline whose magnitude few men fully
anticipated. Newcomers, with rare exception, have made the neces-
sary adjustments, but it is also a rare novitiate who has not felt
constrained by public expectations or who escaped Chief Justice
Taft's feelings of having entered a monastery.4 The Court's most
recent appointee described the move from Cabinet to Court graphi-
cally: "the Justice's phone never rings-even his best friends won't
call him."5 The sudden loneliness, for the type of men who become
Justices, must be painful.
Professional changes, in the second place, have generally taxed
new Justices of every background. Despite frequent demands that
the Justices should have lower court experience, the very testimony
of those who have had it suggests that, for all practical purposes,
every new Justice must be considered a novice in the unique de-
cisional system of the Court.6 For one thing, the dynamics of decision
by a relatively large group having ultimate appellate functions are
bound to generate distinct modes of decision. Power for some pur-
poses may be supreme, but it is always shared, not only among the
nine Justices but among a multitude of actors in a polycentric legal
system. Most new Justices, moreover, have found the disputes to
be resolved "infinitely more complex" and the responsibilities much
more personal than those they have encountered before.7 Few have
failed to be humbled thereby. While experienced lawyers or judges
may have initial technical advantages, as opposed to the politician's
experience in making hard choices of public policy, there is also a
physical fact that only a very, very few men.with long experience
on a key court of appeals could possibly be intimate with the broad
range of subjects rising for review. Justice Douglas' estimate of a
decade to acquire that breadth, indeed, is not greatly less than the
thirteen and one-half year average tenure of Justices since the Civil
War.8 And even if all of the personal and professional considera-
tions were inoperative in particular cases, the Court's own internal
4. See, e.g., MAsoN, BRANDERs: A Fax MAN'S LIFE 514 (1947); 1 PusEY, CrHALmS
EVANS HUH 276 (1951); 2 PRINGLE, TnE LiFE AND Tmies oF Wir-iAm HowAim
TAFT 961 (1939). Justice Murphy wrote after a year on the Court: "We are rushed
beyond belief...." Letter From FM to G. A. Richards, Dec. 16, 1940, Box 9.3.
5. Goldberg, Reflections of the Newest Justice, CONC. EEC. 14418 (daily ed. Aug.
15, 1963).
6. See Frankfurter, The Supreme Court in the Mirror of the Justices, 105 U. PA.
L. REv. 781 (1957).
7. Goldberg, supra note 5.
8. BLAcK, THE PFEOPLE AND THE CourT 180 (1960); Douglas, The Supreme Court
and Its Case Load, 45 CoRNELL L.Q. 401, 413 (1960).
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procedures would produce a "freshman effect" of varying intensity
and duration.
Institutional processes, while they are designed to ease assimilation
burdens of new members, effectively create a transitional phase in
which newcomers have lighter responsibilities and lighter influence.
In conference, the freshman Justice speaks last and votes first, which
means that the Chief Justice and the first senior Justices who disagree
with him have first opportunity at the vital question of framing the
issue. The recently opened papers of Justice Murphy, which include
suggestive notes of conferences held between 1940 and 1947, con-
firm how significant the opportunity of first statement can be in
the hands of a Chief Justice like Hughes, who frequently began the
deliberations with an apt remark to set the mood and then proceeded
to delineate the issues with great economy and dexterity. In the
first Flag Salute Case, for example, Hughes opened the conference
by remarking-"I come up to this case like a skittish horse to a
brass band'-and then proceeded to analyze the problem in a fashion
which was followed precisely, and with little debate, in the ultimate
opinion of the Court. Hardly less influential are the positions of
vigorous senior Justices such as Hugo Black, who appears to have
structured the issues in conference more during this period than is
commonly assumed. Although it is impossible to be systematic, the
Murphy notes leave a distinct impression that issue-setting was pri-
marily a function of the Chief Justice and the seniors who disagreed-
during Hughes' regime, Stone, Roberts and Black; during Stone's,
Roberts, Black and then Frankfurter. During the early 'forties, the
often-observed role of Justice Frankfurter in this respect seems to
have been less in conferences than before and after them for the
reason that at this time his seniority was relatively low.9
Assignments as well as speaking order also are commonly made
with the Justices' seniority and experience in view. After his first
assignment, which by rumored custom the newcomer chooses, he is
likely to serve an apprenticeship with large doses of tax and statutory
routine. Judicial reputation itself, as a consequence, may depend
substantially on such extraneous factors as personal longevity on
the Court and how senior colleagues exercise their power of assign-
ment. Justice Stone, for example, smarted under Chief Justice Taft,
as did Murphy and Rutledge under him.10 Frustration over what they
9. Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940). "Observations of Chief
Justice Hughes," No. 690, 1939 Term, Box 129. The analyst cannot discount the
possibility that, because of speaking order, Murphy's note-taking diminished toward
the end of discussion, though for the most part the notes are extensive when a junior
Justice sought to alter the issues significantly in important cases.
10. MAsoN, op. cit. supra note 1, at 260, 793.
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regard as light work has been a common characteristic of junior
Justices whose views were at variance with their Chief.
Finally, and more subtly, the newcomer's vote and his role in the
opinion-drafting process may be affected by his own personal responses
to the very transitional difficulties at work. These reactions a simple
vote cannot register; these reactions a Justice may be too proud to
reveal; but for an understanding of the judicial process they are too
important to ignore. In Justice Murphy's case, a minimum of three
terms was required before he was assimilated confidently into the
life and work of the Court. During that time, not only did his
substantive views undergo subtle change, but his very "freshman-
ness" as a Justice affected the judicial process-and the law of the land.
II.
It has been easy to assume otherwise. Murphy arrived on the
Supreme Court with an advance reputation as a militant and contro-
versial crusader for civil liberties and the welfare state; and the
public face presented by his opinions reinforced the belief that, for
Murphy, judicial independence merely freed his passionate value
commitments from whatever restraints that existed before. It was
no accident that Murphy offended a profession which prides itself
on subtle accommodation of competing values. Dispensing justice,
by his own confession, was his notion of the judicial function; and
Murphy's "justice" was of a peculiar sort. An instrumentalist toward
law, whose philosophic equipment was a cluster of Thomism, Jeffer-
sonianism, and social environmentalism, he was an evangelist of no
mean talent at reducing complex issues to simple moral terms and
endowing them with powerful prose. From his first major opinion
in Thornhill v. Alabama to his last in the case of communist spy
Gerhart Eisler, Murphy manifested a consistency of vote, a devotion
to individual liberties, and a black-and-white style, especially in
those uncompromising dissents which so frequently resembled essays
in fundamentalist homiletics, that comparisons with the outpourings
of Justice McReynolds were not unjustified." Nevertheless, consider-
able caution is required before one can assume that his relatively
simplistic opinions were the one-to-one projection of personal values.
That strong beliefs existed and were voiced is obvious, but competing
factors were also at work.
One reason for caution is that sharp contrast always existed between
Murphy's public image land the private maker of decisions. In reality,
the Justice was an enigmatic figure of extraordinary complexity.
11. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940). Eisler v. United States, 338 U.S.
189, 193 (1949).
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Priestly of mien, Murphy was also egocentric and a bundle of con-
tradictions. But few were more genuinely considerate of others or
more compassionate of their infirmities. Something of a religious
ascetic, he neither smoked nor drank nor paid attention to money.
But few public men took greater delight in earthy jokes, in the Wash-
ington cocktail circuit, or in the cultivation of celebrities from sports,
government, and the stage. Murphy had been reared to a "life of
service" by a burly Irish father and a dominating, idealistic mother
in an Irish-clan, small town environment at Harbor Beach, Michigan-
and he never quite outgrew either. He spoke gently, was unashamedly
sentimental, and attempted to cloak a tough inner core and a volatile
temperament behind an exterior of saintliness. A man without pre-
tense of intellect, he nonetheless attracted men of great abilities to
his side, was perhaps excessively sensitive to the advice and criticism
of intellectuals, and in his various public offices fought zealously for
ideas commonly considered ahead of his time. If any single general-
ization fits the many-faceted Murphy, it is that he was both a
dedicated idealist and a showman whose compulsion for morality and
humanitarianism in government were all bound up with personal
needs for esteem and approval. God, America, and the Murphys were
his trinity, as Francis Biddle once remarked; the principal reason
for his meteoric rise to power was never intellect as such, but an
extraordinary mixture of ethical passion, an intuitive political shrewd-
ness, and sheer showmanship. Only Murphy, the mass educator, could
have entered the Court describing it as "The Great Pulpit."12
Murphy as a politician always defied the easy label. Although
he shared the isolationist and non-partisan yearnings of Midwestern
Progressivism, he fit closest the militant liberals who acquired power
as representatives of urban-based, minority protest. Even before the
New Deal he drew national attention as a crusading criminal judge
sensitive to minority rights and, above all, as the mayor of Detroit
who pioneered public relief when depression struck. Yet it is useful
to remember that he was also a purist in government, an enemy
of party machines, and a politician of considerable magnetism and
independence. Until the 1936 election, indeed, his chief political
allies in Detroit were the American Legion, Father Charles E.
Coughlin, and the local outlet of William Randolph Hearstl
Later, Murphy became a hero of the Left as an anti-colonialist
Governor General and High Commissioner in the Philippines and then
as Michigan's 'labor governor" during the great sit-down strikes of
1937. There, on the same day that Roosevelt's Court packing plan
was sent to Congress, he produced lasting notoriety by refusing to
12. BmDL, IN BRF AvmoaR 92-94 (1962). The Buffalo News, Jan. 5, 1940.
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enforce court orders evicting UAW strikers from General Motors
plants with the prophetic remark: "We must love justice rather than
its form."13 Still, it is well to recall that as Governor General Mur-
phy engaged Manuel Quezon and General Douglas MacArthur in
a hard-nosed battle all the way to the White House to prevent what
he regarded as the erosion of American authority in Manila; and while
his policy toward mass civil disobedience virtually forced auto manu-
facturers to recognize CIO unions, it was also true that he quickened
settlement of the great strikes by a private ultimatum to John L.
Lewis-a fact he refused to reveal, even though it cost him re-election
in 1938.14
Appointed Attorney General in 1939, pending a vacancy as Secre-
tary of War, he quickly regained prestige for high quality judicial
appointments, crusades against city machines, and efforts to reinforce
civil liberties. He was responsible for the creation of a civil liberties
unit in the Department of Justice. But he also provoked considerable
public controversy, which flared just after he entered the Court, by
backing the first government prosecution of alleged subversives,
both communist and fascist, since 1917, in a politically inspired effort
to undercut Martin Dies and HUAC, whose first victim, incidentally,
had been himself. The "libertarian's libertarian" on the Court, in
short, had a flair for the unexpected. Not only was he a man whom
Cabinet officials predicted would be the first New Deal Justice to go
conservative, but one who was also capable of writing the FBI chief
after he arrived: "Unless we are pudding-headed we will drive from
the land the hirelings who are here to undo the labors of our
Fathers." 5
Even to suggest these contrasts so sharply entails hazards, for as
Harold Ickes once observed, Murphy had great talent at pouring on
the butter and he went out of his way to do it.6 Words instinctively
attuned to the listener had to be taken, along with public preach-
ments, as part of the Murphy style. That he was an honest and
earnest reformer, not even his enemies denied. That government for
him was a ministry, came very close to the truth. But the fervor, it
should be recognized, was a way of expressing a result dramatically
as well as a way of reaching it for one of the most colorful political
13. SELEcTED ADDRESSES OF FnANsr MurPY 57 (1938).
14. See the author's Frank Murphy and the Philippine Commonwealth, 33 PACIFIC
HIIsRcAL REv. 45 (1964); Frank Murphy and the Sit-Down Strikes of 1937, 1
LAmon HISTORY 103 (1960); and Hearings Before the Sub-Committee of the Committee
on the Judiciary on Nomination of Frank Murphy To Be Attorney General of the
United States, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. (1939).
15. 3 IcxEs, THE SECrET DIARY OF HARoLD L. ICKES 70 (1954). Letter From FM
to J. Edgar Hoover, Sept. 7, 1940, Box 92.
16. IC Es, op. cit. supra note 15, at 88.
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figures of recent times.
A final factor complicates the relationship of personality and
judicial decision even more. Murphy entered the Court reluctantly
and with an aggravated sense of inferiority. His appointment, in-
deed, was a paradox. On the one hand, following the death of
Justice Butler in November 1939, Murphy was the "logical choice"
for the vacancy. A Catholic and a progressive, a man of humble
origin and a midwesterner, he satisfied to an unusual degree the
"representational" criteria of religion, section, and political back-
ground traditionally used by Presidents in making selections to the
high Court. What he lacked in judicial experience could be offset
by political breadth unmatched among eligibles; besides, his seven
years on the Detroit Recorder's Court still gave him longer judicial
experience than any other Roosevelt appointee. Mass popularity as
Attorney General assured easy confirmation; and not least in im-
portance, his elevation to the Court made it possible for the President
to relieve a nagging personnel logjam in his administration.
17
Far from a Taft-like lust for the Court, however, Murphy exhibited
an extraordinary resistance to it. Loyalty to the President demanded
that he accept the post if Roosevelt desired. Refusal under the
circumstances would not only embarrass the President but might
leave a bundle of frustrated ambitions dangerously unstilled. But
Murphy aspired to be Secretary of War, a post which Roosevelt had
promised him, and he had genuine doubts, which cut far deeper
than any modest exterior, about his technical proficiency for the
Court. Like a romantic bride caught in a match arranged by realists,
he responded to the speculations about his availability by the only
thing he could safely do-berating his qualifications in public and in
private and reminding the President of loftier motives.
Such had been his reaction when Roosevelt had asked him to run
for Governor of Michigan in 1936. Now he was no less in earnest.
Only four days after the death of Justice Butler, he replied to reporter
Charles G. Ross' attack on the custom of religious representation on
the Court by writing:
I particularly agree with the observation that there "are other men in the
United States better fitted intrinsically to sit on the Supreme Bench"l
As I see it, the view that one of a certain faith should be succeeded by
another of like faith is entirely unworthy.
When it became apparent in early December that the President's
mind was running in the same groove as virtually everyone else's,
Murphy gave the President a list of prominent eligibles, along with
17. BmDLE, op. cit. supra note 12, at 86-87. N.Y. Times, Nov. 21, 1939, P. 22:5.
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a letter of scarcely concealed reproach. After listing the ideal cri-
teria of mind and spirit desired in the post, he wrote:
We must think only of the nation itself.... Members of the Supreme Court
are not called upon nor expected to represent any single interest or group,
area or class of persons. They speak for the country as a whole. Considera-
tions of residential area or class interest, creed or racial extraction, ought
therefore to be subordinated if not entirely disregarded. 18
When the inevitable was finally announced on January 4, 1940, his
anguish was unconcealed. With straightforward candor he unbur-
dened himself to his old parish priest, to whom he wrote: "I am not
too happy about going on the Court. A better choice could have
been made. I fear that my work will be mediocre there while on
the firing line where I have been trained to action I could do much
better." "It has been a difficult decision for me," he added to
Stephen Hannagan, "but two decades back I put on a uniform and
I am still a soldier."19
Resignation tinged with pride was the principal reaction of the
Court's newest Justice, and even if it could be tacitly assumed, as
did Roosevelt, that he would not remain on the bench for long,
Murphy could not resist a parting reproach of the process which put
him there. "I appreciate the honor," he told newsmen, "but I
consider myself unworthy of it and I think a far better selection
could have been made."20
Compounding the paradox and his sensitivity was the fact that he
also entered the Supreme Court under fire. To be sure, criticism
was not aimed at preventing his confirmation by the Senate, as in
the case of justice Brandeis. Nor was an attack mounted to frighten
him into different ways, as in the case of Chief Justice Hughes.
Murphy's crusades had generated mass popularity for himself as a
capable, if not "ideal attorney general"; his appointment was well-
received in the mass media and confirmed by the Senate without so
much as a roll call vote .2  But the very reasons for that public
response, flamboyant political activism accompanied by high-powered
publicity in the Department of Justice, created a strongly adverse
reaction among administration liberals and a strategically located
group of New Deal lawyers, above all Solicitor General Robert H.
18. Letter From FM to Charles G. Ross, Nov. 20, 1939, Box 81. Letter From FM
to FDR, Dec. 9, 1939, Box 82.
19. Letter From FM to William Murphy, Jan. 8, 1940; Letter From FM to Stephen
Hannagan, Jan. 6, 1940, Box 86.
20. IcKES, op. cit. supra note 15, at 110. Press release, MS., Jan. 4, 1940, Fort
Wayne Journal-Gazette, Jan. 4, 1940.
21. Miami Daily News, Jan. 5, 1940. New Orleans Times-Picayune, Jan. 9, 1940.
CONG. BEc. 329 (daily ed. Jan. 15, 1940).
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Jackson, that played no little part in his elevation to the Court.
The Jackson-Murphy collision of 1939, which was actually a rela-
tionship of aloofness rather than one of personal feuding, was an
affair too complex for detailed analysis here. Suffice it to say that
a combination of ambition, personality conflicts, and policy differ-
ences, especially between Murphy's crusades and Jackson's "lawyerly
way," provoked friction in the Department of Justice.22 To relieve
it and to honor his promises to place Jackson and Biddle in the two
top posts of the Department, while at the same time placing a
Catholic on the Court who would "be for us," were major considera-
tions in the President's choice. But when Murphy resisted it publicly,
made statements that implied distrust of Jackson's willingness to
carry out politically-potent crusades, and delayed entry to the Court
for Florida vacations, a sudden flurry of criticism, some spontaneous
and some inspired, appeared in the national press concerning his
"witch hunts" as Attorney General and his personal qualifications
for the Court.23 Although his trips actually were taken with the
approval of Chief Justice Hughes, Murphy was accused of being
personally miserable in the job and of being chastised by Hughes
for indifference and ineptitude in the work of the Court.24 Although
Vice Presidents were seldom created that way, reports circulated
that he had pleaded with Michigan party leaders to obtain the vice
presidential nomination for him so badly did he want off the bench.
25
The Macon News-Telegraph commented of the Court's new member:
To put it mildly, the people who pay Mr. Murphy a salary of $20,000 a
year are wondering when he is going to work .... The fact of the matter
is that the entire career of Murphy is one of the most discreditable in the
history of American politics. . . . Maybe Black was not the last word in
public indecency, after all.
2 6
In retrospect, much of the criticism was petty gossip that did little
justice to the principals or to the genuine issues of policy and
approach between them. It paled beside the regular feuds of the
New Deal; and for the most part, Murphy took the criticism stoically.
"Pay little attention to some of the news stories," he told his Detroit
friend Henry A. Montgomery. "Remember this is an election year-
22. See GEmiART, ROBERT H. JACKSON: AmICA.'S ADVOCATE 161-98 (1958).
BmDLE, op. cit. supra note 12, at 86-87, 92-94.
23. GmaLmT, loc. cit. supra note 22; WmrEHEAD, THE FBI STORY 170-78 (1956).
The N.Y. Times, Feb. 29, 1940, p. 14.
24. Letter From FM to Charles Evans Hughes, Jan. 20, 1940; Letter From Edward
G. Kemp to FM, Jan. 20 and 22, 1940, Box 87.
25. The Detroit News, March 1, 1940. Even Hand, Time, Feb. 26, 1940.
26. Loafing on His Job, The Macon News-Telegraph, MS copy; reprinted, The
Detroit News, Feb. 27, 1940.
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an old timer like yourself knows how the daggers fly during such
a period. I cannot conceive of my leaving the Court for any reason."
27
The persistence of the gossip about the "missing and misbehaving"
new Justice, however, became a source of real concern. At the sug-
gestion of his clerk, he cancelled speaking engagements, publica-
tions, and memberships. After another news story appeared in late
February that he was "disinterested and lackadaiscal" in the work of
the Court, he wrote the Chief Justice: "No one could be happier than
I am to labor with you and my brethren in this vineyard. The state-
ment is all untrue."28 Ever eager to defend the reputation of his
Court, the Chief Justice engineered a denial of his alleged criticism
in The New York Times the following day, which substantially
silenced most of the "groundless yarns." 29
The effects, nevertheless, were enduring. Murphy, all his adult life,
had excelled as a champion of moral rectitude before a mass audience;
now the critical constituency had shifted to a professional elite.
Murphy, all his political life, had won praise for attracting intelli-
gence and integrity into government; now his own were under fire.
Having crossed swords with militant liberals as well as strategically
placed lawyers who regarded him as an incompetent, political inter-
loper in a technical legal world, he entered the Court with a widely
circulated reputation as a misfit.
The result, as in the cases of Justices Davis and Black, was to
aggravate his self-consciousness and his sense of being on trial. In
February, 1940, he wrote Reverend Leo T. Butler:
After three weeks now I have been a full-fledged Associate Justice-at least
as far as the title is concerned-but otherwise I feel very much the "fresh-
man" member that I am and having had a taste of actual work on the Bench
I am beginning to sense more fully the vast responsibility that this Court
bears. I cannot hope to equal what others have done in meeting that
responsibility, but even though I cannot be brilliant I can try to do the
work that is before me thoughtfully and with devotion to the great cause
that we all serve.30
27. Letter From FM to Henry A. Montgomery, Feb. 27, 1940, Box 89. To Judge
Frank Picard, he wrote: "That sort of thing can't be helped. It comes to those in
high places and when one of my mediocrity is up then he looms up as a greater target.
It is a price one pays for distinction and those of us who are good stuff roll with
the punches and thank the Lord for his manifold blessings. I don't like it but with
the others I have to take it. Right now it is doubly offensive to me for I alone am
not concerned-there is the Court to think of-the Supreme Court with its traditions
and its place in the hearts of our people. Were it not for this the arrows would hurt
little; experts have shot them at me in the past and thus far they have fallen harm-
lessly to the ground." Letter From FM to Judge Frank Picard, March 21, 1940, Box 89.
28. The Washington Star, Feb. 17, 1940. The Brooklyn Eagle, Feb. 27, 1940.
Letter from FM to Charles Evans Hughes, Feb. 28, 1940, Box 89.
29. The N.Y. Times, March 1, 1940, p. 12:6. .
30. FRANK, MR. Jusn cE BLACK 108 (1949). Letter From FM to Leo T. Butler,
Feb. 28, 1940. Box 89. KING, LINCOLN'S MANAGER, DAVID DAVIS 191, 201 (1960).
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"To one like myself, who always thought of the Court as something
venerable even though human," he added to Claude G. Bowers, "it
is a strange, indescribable thrill to share in this work. I believe I
am beginning to appreciate the magnitude of the responsibility that
it entails, and I wonder all the more at the faith that the President
and friends like yourself have placed in me. It is a new sea, and I
do not know where my course will take me, but a 'mighty effort."' 3 '
Murphy made his "mighty effort," but powerful feelings of inadequacy
had potent and unexpected effects on some of the great civil liberties
landmarks of the day.
III.
Perhaps the most striking instance of a "freshman effect" is the
very case which did so much to establish Murphy's reputation as a
"libertarian activist," Thornhill v. Alabama. In his first major opinion
and its companion, Carlson v. California, Murphy launched one of
the Court's boldest and most controversial experiments with freedom
of expression-the doctrine that constitutional guarantees of free
communication include peaceful picketing.32 The picketing doctrine,
which was undoubtedly his foremost single contribution to the de-
velopment of the first amendment, justifiably caused commentators
to place Murphy in an ideological niche. Both the State of Alabama
and Shasta County, California, had made it a misdemeanor for any-
one to go near, to loiter, or to picket a place of business without just
cause or legal excuse. Though no question of the peaceful, truthful,
or limited character of the picketing existed in either case, Thornhill
had been convicted for asking a worker not to cross a picket line
and Carlson for carrying signs. When the convictions were appealed
with AFL assistance, the Supreme Court responded with three
unusual steps.
First, instead of merely reversing the convictions, the Court nulli-
fied the ordinances "on their face," on the theory that they were so
broadly prohibitive of free speech as to amount to a prior restraint.
Second, the assumption which established the Court's jurisdiction, that
peaceful picketing is a form of communication, Justice Murphy made
explicit in broad libertarian terms. "Free discussion concerning the
conditions in industry and the causes of labor disputes appears to
us indispensable to the effective and intelligent use of the processes
of popular government to shape the destiny of modem industrial
31. Letter From FM to Claude G. Bowers, Feb. 28, 1940. Box 89.
32. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. '88 (1940); :Carlson v. California, 310- U.S.
106 (1940). Contrary to general impression, Murphy's first published opinion was in
Tradesm6ns Nat'l Bank v. Oklahoma .Tax Comm'n, 309 U.S. 560 (1940), though
Thornhill may well have been his first assignment.
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society," he declared.n In the circumstances of our times, as the
Court ruled in Carlson, "publicizing the facts of a labor dispute in a
peaceful way through appropriate means, whether by pamphlet, by
word of mouth or by banner, must now be regarded as the liberty
of communication which is secured to every person by the Fourteenth
Amendment. . . ."34 Finally, while reserving judgment as to the
scope of state power to regulate picketing by narrowly drawn statutes
aimed at specific evils, the Court offered the clear and present danger
test, as strictly conceived by Justice Brandeis in Whitney v. California,
to measure the breadth of this newly federalized freedom.35 Justice
McReynolds alone dissented without opinion.
The picketing decisions, though their outcome was expected, were
a tour de force. Rendered with surprising unanimity, their language
and effect were revolutionary. Prior to the decision it was prob-
lematic whether picketing was even legal in many states, let alone a
federal constitutional right. While a generation of union efforts had
preceded the decision with mixed results, and while Justice Brandeis
in 1937 had dropped a famous dictum that picketing might be speech,
the question of limits on state power was fresh. The Thornhill deci-
sion thus not only enlarged the concept-of speech, but also federalized
"the voice of labor," and made picketing a matter of constitutional
import, all at the expense of traditional state rules.36
Furthermore, the opinion contained significant seeds for the de-
velopment of civil liberties law generally. For the first time the
Court applied the clear and present danger test beyond the problem
of seditious utterance for which it was designed. The opinion also
embraced the concept that the social value of ideas justifies their
constitutional status, a concept which became a double-edged sword
in subsequent censorship cases. And it strengthened a new stream
of precedents which nullified overly-broad statutes affecting free
speech "on their face."37 This form of analysis, which was then in
vogue, one suspects, largely because of Chief Justice Hughes, made
serious inroads into the Court's requirement of standing, by relieving
the challenger's burden of proving that a statute was unconstitutional
as applied to him. All told, the Justices were clearly departing from
their normal precautions of saving statutes by confining them to the
33. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 101-03.
34. Carlson v. California, 310 U.S. 106, 113 (1940).
35. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 376-77 (1927).
36. Teller, Picketing and Free Speech, 56 H~Auv. L. REv. 180 (1942). See also
Sem v. Tile Layers Protective Union, 301 U.S. 468, 478 (1937); Jaffe, In Defense of
the Supreme Court's Picketing Doctrine, 41 MIcH. L. Rv. 1037, 1054 (1943).
37. See Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147
(1939). Cf. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 358 (1927) (Brandeis, J.); Strom-
berg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 368, 370 (1931).
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facts or by reading into them high standards of intent. The decisions,
as the Washington Post and The Nation then observed, were of "far
reaching importance." "Justice Murphy has made a fine debut."38
Precisely because such sweeping decisions came so early, and pro-
duced such subsequent controversy, the picketing cases supported
common assumptions that Justice Murphy followed "Jacobinism and
class consciousness" without regard to competing values.3 The
libertarian character of the cases, however, cannot be explained merely
on the ground that the Justice was so dim-witted or so ideologically
obsessed that the issues were not understood. However justifiable
the criticism of Thornhill, and much of it was, the case is a relatively
poor example of how "hyperactive concern for individual rights" can
lead to folly.40 The Thornhill decision is better comprehended as a
case of misunderstood intent, a problem not uncommon for constitu-
tional innovations where great forces stand to win or to lose large
stakes. Thornhill also provides a classic illustration of a freshman
Justice at work and how his very newness on the Court may influence
judicial decision. In the picketing cases, the Supreme Court faced
a dual task of adjusting concepts of liberty to the industrial age
and of assimilating a new member to itself. That the two were related
in fact demonstrates anew the complexity of the judicial process.
An aftermath of misunderstood intent was perhaps inherent in the
substantive dilemma of the case. How could the element of communi-
cation in picketing be defended without weakening state power to
preserve other interests? Despite their neglect in subsequent debates,
the facts as presented by union counsel did not permit easy avoid-
ance of the question whether peaceful picketing was sheltered by the
Constitution. Thornhill had been arrested after seven weeks of
unmolested picketing during a strike; arrest came only after he had
asked an employee not to cross the picket line; and only Thornhill,
the union leader, had been arrested. There was no violence, no
sign of intimidation, and no immediate threat of injury. There had
been only, as Chief Justice Hughes argued in conference, an effort
to persuade. The Alabama Supreme Court had construed Thornhill's
verbal appeal, nonetheless, as proof of the harmful intent which was
an essential element of the statutory offense. A clear consensus
developed among the Justices, as the case was discussed, that state
power to regulate labor relations had been used to cloak a suppression
of free speech and that the Court had a duty to intervene against
what the Chief called "arbitrary legislation." 41
38. 150 THE NATIoaN 553 (1940); The Washington Post, April 23, 1940.
39. Hutcheson, Book Review, 30 A.B.A.J. 106 (1944).
40. ParrcHErr, Tim ROOS.VELT COURT 285 (1948).
41. Conference notes, undated, No. 514, Box 129.
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The only basis of intervention was the fourteenth amendment.
Because of the sensitivity of recently appointed Justices to past
restriction of state regulatory power by that route, however, consen-
sus also formed that this new limitation on state authority should
be held to a minimum. The intent of most Justices, beyond question,
was to protect the communicative aspect of picketing while leaving
the abuses of speech and the evils of the practice under traditional
state control. "Our job as I see it," Justice Murphy noted to his
clerk, "is to write a reversal without serious prejudice to the police
power of the state which I believe is imperative to safeguard without
unduly curtailing the right to free expression."42 The real question
was how.
To state the general proposition was easier than to accommodate
the interests at stake. Compounding the problems ordinarily pre-
sented by a delicate question of public policy was the fact that he
was new to the decisional modes of the Court and, in a sense,
abnormally on his own. While the assignment itself probably had
resulted from his labor experience and the tradition that new Justices
cut teeth on the case of their choice, the same tradition also would
soften internal criticism normally to be expected in a case of such
moment. Labor experience would be of little real value to the
precise issue. Neither, for that matter, would rich experience in law.
Close precedents did not exist. Though he had no serious objection
against using it, the Justice recognized that Brandeis' Senn statement
was "dictuin only" and not precisely apposite.43 All he had for guid-
ance were the general sense of conference and analogous cases of
overly broad ordinances governing handbill circulation and radical
activities.
Cautious before an important issue of national policy, on the
one hand, and personally diffident on the other, the Justice improvised
for Thornhill a system of decision within his office which established
a pattern for the "big cases" until about 1943, when confidence fully
returned. This pattern of decision was at once a revival of past tech-
niques, with its heavy delegation of authority, and a microcasm of the
Supreme Court at work. The pattern was unusual, not only because
of its heavy reliance on others, but also because on a few occasions
Murphy even resorted to help from outside the Court, especially from
his life-long intimate, most trusted confidante, and Washington room-
mate, Edward G. Kemp, whose views, in the half-dozen or so cases
in which he was consulted, bore a strong resemblance to those of Chief
Justice Stone.44
42. Ibid. Note From FM to clerk, dated April 1940, No. 514, Box 129.
43. See note 37 supra. Marginal note on draft opinion, No. 514, Box 129.
44. Consulting Kemp raises a touchy normative issue in an adversary system, in
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The normal sequence was that Justice Murphy, after discussing the
case at conference and with his clerk, would set the clerk to writing
on the basis of general direction in notes and memoranda prepared
by himself. After soliciting criticism from the clerks, other Justices,
and occasionally from Kemp, Murphy would circulate the usual
draft opinion among the Justices for the same process to begin again.
His major opinions thus were collegial in a double sense. The clerks
were chiefly responsible for research and the details of writing under
his supervision. Kemp was used, as Murphy always had used him,
as a conservative foil and as a guard against his own impulsiveness.
Rarely, if ever, did Kemp's views influence the outcome. Murphy
kept the power of decision to himself. His role as a Justice, though
he invited a remarkable degree of internal debate among his staff, was
the role which he always had carved for himself-to make the
policy decision and then to persuade. In his freshman years, par-
ticularly, his office resembled a kind of miniature court, in which
a dialogue of opposing views was encouraged, before the Justice
committed his vote or his pen. His very diffidence as a newcomer
made him all the more attentive to the differences of opinion which
he stimulated in order to avoid error. The very strength of his
consciousness as a fledgling judge weakened whatever ideological
compulsion has been thought to exist. Judging, for Murphy, was
an agonizing process.
Though a full reconstruction is impossible because identities have
not been preserved, the process of self-persuasion had important
consequences for the picketing doctrine. The problem of the case,
as perceived by the opinion drafters, was not one of selling a public
policy, but how to fulfill the official task of translating a general
consensus about a result into a workable balance of interests. That
problem rapidly reduced itself to, establishing the precise nature and
scope of the right on which Thornhill's reversal could be justified.
Was it an assembly, was it free speech, or could reversal be placed
on a lesser and safer ground? Drafting the opinion became a process
of choosing among alternatives, each championed by a different
spokesman around the Justice, and each to a certain degree distasteful.
one sense more serious than the Justice's commonly assumed dependence on law clerks,
because Kemp was also general counsel of the Budget Bureau. Besides ThornhiU and
Meadowmoor mentioned here, Kemp criticized Murphy's draft opinions in Schneiderman
v. United States, 320 U.S. 118 (1943); Prince v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts,
321 U.S. 158 (1943); and Hooven & Allison Co. v. Evatt, 324 U.S. 652 (1944). Only
in the latter, in which Kemp drew from special competence gained as Murphy's legal
adviser in the Philippines, can any influence be detected, and that concerned mainly
technical trade information available from the government rather than the "policy"




The result, as frequently occurs for the Court as a whole, was an
opinion that suffered not so much because it played policy favorites
as because it was divided unto itself.
Upon receiving the case, the Justice provided his clerk with a
general outline of his views, which were inchoate. Then he fished
for bait. "We ought to review the true nature and extent of the
right of assembly," he wrote. "Does it include picketing as we know
it?"45 With the clerk's reply on March 30, 1940, the real debate
was on. The clerk replied:
I agree entirely on the necessity of writing so as not to prejudice the power
of the state to keep the peace and set limits to the rights of contestants in
an industrial dispute. The historical right of assembly may not include
picketing. I doubt that it does. It occurs to me, however, that no right of
assembly is involved where the statute is construed so as to apply to one
man speaking to another in a public street. The presence of two is an
essential to any freedom of discussion. Can we not avoid the extremely
difficult point you raise? It seems to me that the right of assembly is less
well defined than any other.46
In the clerk's view, reversal could be justified on two possible
grounds: (1) the fact that guilt turned on purpose rather than on
conduct, or (2) the fact that "petitioner is not being punished for
picketing, but for speaking." By concentrating on speech, the Court
could narrow the opinion by the usual disclaimers, and avoid the
larger question of state power to control picketing as such.47 Ap-
parently the Justice accepted the proposals, and the opinion began to
be drafted on that basis, with Murphy also writing some broad
rhetorical paragraphs, which he ultimately discarded, to establish
his credentials in the "Great Pulpit."
When the first draft was completed, however, sober second thoughts
set in. "I still think the act of speaking was only evidentiary of the
purpose or intent that made the picketing unlawful, not the offense
itself," came a rebuttal to the clerk's theory from an unknown critic,
who might have been another Justice, but who sounded like Kemp.
"You still have the problem whether the state can prohibit picketing,
and it seems dangerous to view it (as union counsel would like)
merely as a question of free speech. . . . It is unrealistic too. The
decision would become a virtual bar to the effective exercise of public
authority in these matters." How could the Court reverse without
ignoring the fact that the statute did not outlaw speech or picketing
as such but only picketing accompanied by specific intent to harm?
45. Note From FM to clerk, April 1940, No. 514, Box 129.
46. Note From clerk to FM, March 30, 1940, No. 514, Box 129.
47. Unsigned memo, March 30, 1940,. No.. 514, Box 129.
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How could the Court reverse without also ignoring the fact that
Thornhill was picketing as well as speaking? Worse still, how could
the Court reverse without immunizing all conduct accompanied by
utterance from effective state control?
48
Presumably, the Justices in voting for reversal had rejected this
either-or view of the problem. But the rebuttal, which closely
resembled Alabama's position, was so clearly at odds with the theory
of the draft opinion that Justice Murphy became worried. Broaden-
ing the consultations, he suggested visits by the clerk to Justice
Stone and even to the retired Justice Brandeis, "if convenient," to
help resolve doubts. The Justice took soundings himself, and in a
long note to the clerk, he indicated the depth of his concern. "The
opinion as drafted seems to me to be predicated upon a miscon-
ception of the true nature of the offense charged & the evil at which
the statute is directed," he wrote. "I am not sure of this but am
disturbed by it."
Are we to assume that the act complained of and prohibited was the act
of speaking to a prospective employee, informing him there was a strike
and saying that they didn't want anyone to go in there and work? Counsel
for def. astutely drew our attention to that feature of the defendant's
conduct to the virtual exclusion of the other features of the case and the
main purpose of the statute.
Whether the mere act of speaking to a prospective worker, for the pur-
pose prescribed by the statute could itself be made a penal offense or
enjoined without infringement of the broad fundamental right of free
speech it is hardly necessary to decide.
Wasn't the actual offense loitering and picketing, for the purpose, etc.?
And wasn't the conversation evidence only of the intent or purpose-I don't
know-but we ought to answer this in our own minds before we get on to
the wrong track....
Read the provisions of the British Trade disputes and Trade Union Act
of 1927. Of course the reference to intimidation in this act is important-
But what about Legislative prerogative? Are we getting off onto a novel
doctrine?
I am moved by Brandeis, great champion of labor unions in Duplex v.
Deering. You will recall his admonition that it is the duty not of the judges
but of the legislature to declare the limits of permissible contest and to
declare the duties which the new situation demands. To go so far as to
say that legislatures may not regulate the practice of picketing in the public
interest because of incidental infringement on free speech and assembly, in
an area of dispute, may be to extend Constitutional guarantees far beyond
reasonable limits. I am not at all sure of this but we must think straight &
clear about it.
Then came the fateful question of the Roosevelt Court:
48. Unsigned, five page memo, March 30, 1940, No. 514, Box 129.
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Are we moving-in our desire to maintain free speech and assembly-the
freedoms concerning which in my thought and actions I place above nearly
every other consideration-in the direction of paralyzing popular government
and making democracy if we go the full length-of such logic-ridiculous and
impotent?
The notes you have prepared are careful & I believe correctly express
the view adopted by the court in conference. But if on second sober
breath we can steer this case away from the pitfalls & still keep fidelity to
the freedoms that is just what we ought to do.49
To avoid the pitfalls required additional efforts to limit the new
principle. The first problem was to describe the scope of affected
conduct. Picketing, as the Justice noted during his conversations,
"is a variable term," covering behavior that ranged from informa-
tional protests to outright coercion. While the opinion nowhere
expressly equated all picketing and free speech, was it safe to leave
implicit or in footnote references the Court's cognizance of those
variations? "Haven't we got to analyze picketing?" the Justice asked.
Some solace could be found, of course, in listing examples of conduct,
e.g., picketing en masse, which the Court had no intention of wresting
from state control; and Murphy's second draft added several which
were the very ones that the Justices, after much travail, later out-
lined.50 Yet, how could either picketing or its evils be so precisely
defined without deciding cases not before the Court?
A second and related problem was the remedy for the indefinite-
ness of Alabama's statute. The basic flaw, by common consensus,
was its absolute character, its failure to distinguish the coercive
aspects of picketing from harmless forms; and toward the final phase
of drafting, greater attention was focused on this aspect of the case.
"I agree," Murphy told his clerk, "that part of the answer is insistence
on statutes precisely framed & free from nebulousness when they
undertake to set limits on a citizen's right of expression." 51 That
insistence had the additional advantage of being in the stream of
recent precedents, such as Lovell v. Griffin, which nullified un-
restricted public authority to license handbill distribution without up-
49. Handwritten memos From FM to clerk, undated, No. 514, Box 129.
50. Handwritten Note, undated. His marginal criticism of the second draft contained
an addition in his hand to foreclose any implication that "picketing in such numbers or
otherwise conducted to present a threat of violence or injury or [which] constitutes
annoyance or substantial interference with the right of privacy or free exercise of
other rights may not be regulated by a statute narrowly drawn to cover the precise
situation." No. 514, Box 129. The irony is that, after much disputation in which
he also took part, the picketing doctrine has been narrowed to a fairly similar status.
See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Vogt, 354 U.S. 284 (1957); International Bhd.
of Teamsters v. Hanke, 339 U.S. 470 (1950); Hughes v. Superior Court of California,
339 U.S. 460 (1950); Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490 (1949).
51. Handwritten Note From FM to clerk, undated, No. 514, Box 129.
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setting it when narrowly focused . 2 The parallel Murphy regarded
as clear because he believed an irreducible element of censorship
was involved in Alabama's wholesale prohibition of picketing. More-
over, he was attracted to the notion that the Court ought to void
overly-broad ordinances affecting free speech "on their face." After
all, if a statute admitted no exceptions, the whole people would be
restrained by its coercive effects as much as the petitioner; and how
better could the Court induce states to take a less disastrous alterna-
tive than to nullify their blanket prohibitions outright?
5 3
Still, Murphy had long advocated the clear and present danger test
as the "true course" to follow in dilemmas of liberty versus authority,
and Thornhill offered an opportunity to advance a revival of the test
already begun in Herndon v. Lowry.M The problem, he conceded, was
essentially one of balancing interests. Where states failed to do so,
the remedy was judgment "on the face." Where closer situations
occurred, clear and present danger would provide an ample guide to
mark the boundary of individual freedom and state power. That
mixture, however, was the rub. Out of zeal to explain both the
principle and its limits as a total problem, the Justice left uncertain
the essential basis of the particular judgment. Was Thornhill's con-
viction reversed because the statute was overly-broad, because his
speech in fact had been suppressed, or because his behavior con-
tained no threats of immediate injury? Janus-faced, the opinion
which Murphy circulated among the other Justices was all three.
That fact, perhaps as much as the courtesy which Justices tradi-
tionally extend to new colleagues, accounts for the opinion's un-
ruffled reception when circulated among the others. The opinion
contained something for everyone. Only Justice Stone raised serious
criticism, and even his was not directed to the basic premise that
picketing was speech and therefore constitutionally regulated. While
encouraging Murphy in making painstaking analysis, Stone had mis-
givings mainly about the wisdom of nullifying the statute on its face.
It is doubtful that Justice Stone had favored inclusion of that pro-
cedure in the first paragraph of his Carolene footnote, and this case
illustrated the reasons for hesitation.5 5 To void an ordinance on its
face meant that it could never be applied to anyone under any
circumstances, but Stone had no difficulty imagining conduct to
52. See note 37 supra. See also Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931).
53. Note, 61 H.Av. L. lEtv. 1208 (1948).
54. 301 U.S. 242 (1937). The Test of Patriotism, 2 NAT' LAvW. GULD Q. 165-70
(1939).
55. Letter From Harlan F. Stone to FM, April 19, 1940, No. 514, Box 129.
United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938). MASON, op. Cit.
supra note 1, at 793; Braden, The Search for Objectivity in Constitutional Law, 57
YALE L.J. 571, 580 (1948).
[ VOL. 18
JUSTICE MURPHY
which Alabama's statute could be applied. What, for example, if
Thornhill had picketed in order to throw a brick? Here, of course,
he thought some measure of free speech was involved because
Thornhill spoke while walking up and down, and Stone was inclined
to go along with the reversal on the basis of the Court's analogous
conclusion in the Stromberg case. But preferring an opinion closer
to the facts, he withheld agreement until assured that no one else
had similar reservations. 56
No one did. Four Justices-Hughes, Stone, Frankfurter, and Doug-
las-did object to Murphy's casual assertion that the workers' interest
in industrial conditions "transcended" that of employers. To make
unnecessary comparisons would have been a serious tactical error,
as Justice Stone cautioned, by inviting criticism of social predilections
and by rubbing the fur of employers the wrong way.57 But a quick
patch suggested by the Chief Justice overcame that transgression,
and the case went to conference. "Well we are ready to proceed
with our mutton," remarked the Chief, who seemed to be the driving
force against the statute; and after Stone acquiesced, the Court
agreed to accept language mutually agreeable to Justices Black and
Murphy to express the result in Carlson v. California.58 The only
significant change wrought by the processes of collegial thought
during circulation of that opinion was deletion of Murphy's string
of examples of conduct on which the Court expressed no opinion in
favor of a tighter, general statement that state power to control
specific evils by narrowly drawn statutes remained untouched.5 9
Otherwise, no record exists in the Murphy papers that any Justice
protested the conceptual basis of the picketing decisions, whether
the association of picketing with speech or the clear and present
danger test. No record exists that any Justice questioned the fusion
of multiple analytical strands to link the doctrine to the small array
of precedent available. And no record exists to suggest that other
Justices besides Stone and McReynolds considered the Court's action
to be precipitate. "I cannot agree! but I do not care to expand
dissent," Justice McReynolds commented. The rest was a chorus of
approval across the judicial spectrum. "A fine piece of work," "a
grand expression of noble governmental policies," was the response
of recent Roosevelt appointees; but Justice Roberts' reaction differed
little: "Yes, sir! A carefully balanced and discriminating treatment
56. Letter From Harlan F. Stone to FM, April 19, 1940, No. 514; Box 129. Strom-
berg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931).
57. Ibid. Comments on first circulated slip opinion, No. 514, Box 129.
58. Conference Note, April 20, 1940, Box 90; Undated Note From FM to clerk,
No. 514, Box 129.
59. Ibid. Draft opinion, No. 667, Box 129.
1965]
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
of this troublesome subject."60 The consensus of the Court seemed
to be expressed by the Justice who wrote on his Carlson slip opinion:
This gives me a chance to say what I put very inadequately on the Thorn-
hill opinion-that this is work of the very best judicial quality. It decides
extremely important issues fearlessly but also circumspectly, in language that
rises to the heights of the great argument, appropriate to the profound issues
canvassed & the best traditions of the Court. I warmly congratulate you &
rejoice to be with you.
61
Most striking, in view of the aftermath, was not what the other
Justices said in reviewing the Thornhill opinion, but what they did
not say. Even discounting their friendly encouragement to a new-
comer, even discounting their jockeying for his future support, the
response of Murphy's colleagues made it difficult to believe that they
were seriously dissatisfied with his attempt to strike a judicious
balance between individual freedom and state control.
If the foregoing proposition is accurate that the Justices at the
time considered the Thornhill opinion to be sufficiently guarded,
seldom have they miscalculated more. Denounced by eminent authori-
ties as "quixotic," as "one of the greatest pieces of folly ever per-
petrated by the Supreme Court," Thornhill has met criticism seldom
equalled since 1937.62 Scarcely an aspect of the opinion, whether
judging "on the face," limiting state law, or the public information
premise, has escaped scholarly attack save the one of most con-
temporary interest-the casual application of the fourteenth amend-
ment to private property. Thornhill had been picketing in a company
town.
63
It is not our purpose to revive the sound and fury which the
decision provoked, particularly the subsequent "jurisprudence by
epithets" among scholars based upon assumptions that picketing was
either pure speech or pure coercion.64 From the perspective of a
quarter century, it is clear that the Justices assumed otherwise and
that their problem, accordingly, was how to draw lines. Given the
nature of the economic interests and of the governmental relation-
60. Comments on final circulation, No. 514, Box 129.
61. Slip opinion No. 667, Box 129.
62. Pnrrcrmr, op. cit. supra note 40, at 285. GREGORY, LABOR AND THE LAV 328
(2d rev. ed. 1958).
63. See, e.g., Freund, The Supreme Court and Civil Liberties, 4 VAND. L. Rnv. 533,
539 (1951); Green, The Supreme Court, the Bill of Rights, and the State, 97 U. PA.
L. REv. 608, 624 (1949); Gregory, Constitutional Limitations on the Regulation of
Union and Employer Conduct, 49 Micu. L. REv. 191 (1950); Teller, Picketing and
Free Speech, 56 HcAv. L. BEv. 180 (1942).
64. Jones, Picketing and Coercion: A Jurisprudence of Epithets, 39 VA. L. Rtv.
1023 (1953). See Jaffe, supra note 36, at 1054. Cox, The Influence of Mr. justice
Murphy on Labor Law, 48 MicH. L. REv. 767, 774 n.28 (1950).
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ships at stake, the doctrine was bound to be controversial; given the
magnitude of the constitutional breakthrough, a degree of confusion
regarding its sweep was not unusual. Refinement case by case, as
well as reading more into the opinion than it contained, were inevita-
ble. However, it is also clear that the opinion itself was partially,
though not exclusively, responsible for the ultimate surgery it re-
ceived. For the Thornhill opinion could be interpreted either as
merely condemning blanket restrictions on picketing or as investing
the practice with such constitutional status that it was removed from
all local regulation except under conditions of clear and present
danger, which proved to be an elusive test. Even so, that weakness
can hardly be explained as an accidental convergence of a doctrinaire
Justice and a freshman status which led his colleagues to drown
their misgivings in the customs of the Court.65 The main difficulty
with Tho'rnhill was not that no attempt was made to guard the
opinion, but that it was made by a Justice who was unsure of himself
and caught in a complex crossfire between rival doctrines and power-
ful personalities, both among older Justices and the new. The main
problem of craftsmanship in Thornhill, one is tempted to say, was
that Justice Murphy was trying too hard.
IV.
And so it went for the next several months. Murphy entered the
Court greatly agitated over the military unpreparedness of the
United States and "sickened with the apathy of our people."6 6 He
also arrived fresh from battle and a mass education campaign to set
a balanced civil liberties policy for a period of national emergency.
But a series of Jehovah's Witness cases, which placed both values in
conflict, seemed to disquiet well-settled views. In the Gobitis67 case,
for instance, Murphy did not share the belief of Hughes and certain
New Deal Justices that the framers would have considered the com-
pulsory flag salute inoffensive to the first amendment. His first reac-
tion was to prepare a dissent on the ground that so "officious and
unnecessary" an intrusion on religious conscience could only be made
under national emergency power in direst extremity; but his policy
orientation was so blatant and untenable as a legal proposition that
he held his tongue.68 Apart from the appeal of "self-restraint," the
65. Wallace Mendelson has explained the absence of qualifying opinions on this
ground. Mendelson, Neo-Behavioralism-A Rebuttal, 57 Am. POL. Scr. lRv. 951, 952
(1963). See note 32 supra.
66. Letter From FM to Joseph R. Hayden, April 9, 1940, Box 90.
67. Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940). "Observations of
Chief Justice Hughes," April 25, 1940, No. 690, Box 129.
68. Handwritten draft, No. 690, Box 129.
1965 ]
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
controlling factor in Murphy's acquiescence seemed to be that the
petitioner merely sought reinstatement into a public school following
expulsion for refusing to salute. Had a penalty for truancy attached,
a far more serious question would have resulted, along with a
response that foreshadowed his subsequent confessional in Jones v.
Opelika and West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette. Even
in 1940, Justice Stone's discussion of accommodating interests struck
Murphy as "sensible."
69
On the other hand, while Justice Murphy approved absorption of
the right of free worship into the fourteenth amendment in Cantwell
v. Connecticut, he drafted a concurrence expressing the view that
Justice Roberts' opinion inadequately preserved state authority to
control group coercion and public fighting by religious sects. He
was willing to join the opinion on the question of licenses, he said, in
contrast to the Terminiello situation of 1949, only because it lent no
countenance "to the view that verbal attacks on particular races or
creeds, inciting violence and breaches of the peace, have the sanction
of the Constitution." Yet this opinion, too, he withheld after Justice
Roberts strengthened references to state licensing power and his
clerk advised that he "should not give the appearance of making a
speech about civil and religious liberties especially in view of the
fact [that] you already have expressed your stand on these matters in
the Thornhill case." "There is always danger," the clerk cautioned,
"that a casual expression, intended to give the State power to control
street fighting, may be used by an unfriendly court to deprive minority
groups of all freedom of expression." 70
While Murphy's recent experience as Attorney General made him
sensitive to problems created by religious disorders, competing im-
pulses to safeguard liberty, as well as uncertainty as how to make his
influence felt, threw him into real ambivalence. Slowly, the Justice was
learning his trade throughout the first term, but indecisiveness was the
main result, along with plain discomfort. At the beginning of the
summer recess, he could hold his feelings no longer. Offering the
President his services rather than taking a vacation, he wrote Roose-
velt:
My faith is of the militant kind.... It has been my hope that you would
go forward with your original plans for me. But I myself would want those
69. Typed draft and unsigned, undated memo, No. 690, Box 129. Jones v. Opelika,
316 U.S. 584, 641 (1942); West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624,
645 (1943). Marginal note, slip opinion, No. 690, Box 129.
70. Cantwell v. Conn., 310 U.S. 296 (1940); undated draft concurrence; clerk to
FM, May 3, 1940. Justice Stone also would have concurred regarding state licensing
power, but decided not to after Justice Roberts deleted sections of the opinion which
questioned whether state regulation of solicitation constituted a prior restraint. Copy
Stone to Roberts, May 2, 1940, No. 632, Box 129.
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plans changed if it were in the country's best interest to do so. You must be
free in judgment. You will be best served by men of humility and a will.
You have always done me more than justice. You owe me naught. I am
your debtor.
71
Although the President found him no errand that summer, Roose-
velt apparently gave serious consideration to re-appointing him Attor-
ney General or as High Commissioner to the Philippines in 1941.72
Murphy probably would have accepted the former position, though
he agonized long about it; but in the end neither opportunity came.
The result was a Justice who became resigned, and then reasonably
happy on the Court, but in the intervening months of the 1940-1941
terms, the pattern of equivocation and vacillation resumed.
In the Meadowmoor Dairies73 case, for example, which was the
first opportunity to test the reach of the picketing doctrine, the Justice
itched to write in defense of Thornhill when the majority of that case
split for the first time. There, in an opinion by Justice Frankfurter,
the Court upheld state power to enjoin picketing, in itself peaceful,
after prolonged violence had occurred in a dispute. Although Murphy
voted in the majority against Justices Black, Reed, and Douglas, he
was dissatisfied with the draft opinions of both Frankfurter and
Black, whom he thought manifested "judicial jitters," "Both opinions,"
he told his new clerk, "are eloquent and emotional and as I view
them not in good order." Justice Frankfurter, in his judgment, was
excessively cautious about stressing the facts of violence. Justice
Black, he believed, minimized that violence and distorted the injunc-
tion in order to fit it under Thornhill and Carlson. Neither, he
thought, adequately applied the governing principles of those cases
to the situation at hand. "We might even do it ourselves," Murphy
hinted, to "indicate their true scope and meaning." 74 Quite simply,
he believed, Thornhill confirmed rather than denied state power to
control picketing in circumstances of violence.
Setting the wheels in motion to write, the Justice stimulated an-
other debate in his own camp, which ranged from Kemp's unrecon-
structed argument that peaceful picketing was not synonymous with
free discussion to doubts akin to Justice Black's, whether peaceful
picketing, even when entangled with past violence, could be en-
71. Letter From FM to FDR, June 10, 1940. Franklin D. Roosevelt Library: Official
Files 41A, United States Supreme Court.
72. Unsent Letter From FM to FDR, July 28, 1941, Box 98. Letter From FM to
FDR, December 22, 1941. Roosevelt Library, Official Files 400-Philippine Islands.
Copy, Telegram From Manuel Quezon to Michael Elizalde, June 16, 1941, Box 97.
Letter From Joseph R. Hayden to FM, June 4, 10, 1941, Box 97. Cf. BIDDLE, op. cit.
supra note 12, at 164-165.
73. Milk Wagon Driver's Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., 312 U.S. 287 (1941).
74. Note From FM to clerk, undated, No. 1, 1940 Term, Box 129.
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joined when other remedies were adequate to protect the interests
of employers and of the state.75 The advice of his clerk, heavy as it
was with real politik, kept the Justice quiet. Despite his lament that
the Justice's junior position had lost him the assignment, the clerk
advised him frankly not to waste his eminently strategic position by
adding another opinion to those of Justices Frankfurter, Black, and
Reed. Said he:
All three will try to woo you. Wouldn't it be better to work out your own
views? Then pick the opinion that comes the closest. Then start work
(a la Stone) on that. The name of Murphy in this case means much. It
adds great weight to the opinion bearing it since you wrote Thornhill. I'd
act accordingly. 76
Needing little encouragement, Murphy went quietly to work on
Justice Frankfurter, whose opinion he thought basically "followed
a sound legal path." The fruits of one of his first efforts at internal
"bargaining" were sweet. Though anxious to avoid words that might
heat up the atmosphere, Justice Frankfurter was willing to absorb
Murphy's suggestions into his opinion.7 "We do not qualify the
Thornhill and Carlson decisions," he wrote for the Court. "We re-
affirm them." "Peaceful picketing is the workingman's means of com-
munication. But utterance in a context of violence can lose its
significance as an appeal to reason and become part of an instrument
of force." The pattern of violence here was "precisely the kind of
situation which the Thornhill opinion excluded from its scope."78
No one could doubt the power of a state to protect the public peace
and welfare.
Notwithstanding his libertarian "image," Murphy began his Court
career with that principle fully in view. While its concrete transla-
tion was still imprecise, both in his mind and in the Court's articula-
tion of it from case to case, there can be no doubt that, as the
Justices began to explore the reaches of the first amendment, Murphy
was operating on relativistic premises. While the judiciary had "no
more solemn duty" than to protect freedom of utterance, he then
wrote in an unpublished passage, "that guarantee, while precious, is
not absolute at all times and places, and all circumstances." While
the Constitution afforded individual action wide latitude, he asserted
in Gobitis, "in all things that are essential and appropriate for the
maintenance of an orderly and healthy society and the protection
75. Note From Edward G. Kemp to clerk, Feb. 7, 1941; Note From clerk to
FM, Feb. 10, 1941, No. 1, 1940 Term, Box 129.
76. Note From clerk to FM, Feb. 7, 1941, No. 1, 1940 Term, Box 129.
77. Note From FM to clerk, undated; Letter From Felix Frankfurter to FM, Feb.
7, 1941, No. 1, 1940 Term, Box 129.
78. 312 U.S. 287, 293, 297 (1941).
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of public morals, the acts of the individual are subject to the will
of the group."7 9 That he was not more vocal in articulating his
restrictive side was a function of the same factors at work in Thorn-
hill, now operating in reverse-his unsettled outlook as a newcomer
and the interplay of principle and of personality on the Court. But
the fact is that Murphy, throughout his first two terms, acted on a
dual theory of the free speech problem. Some words, such as "group
defamation," were inherently "bad"; all others were situational. Not
only had his picketing opinions expressly exempted from their scope
graduated ordinances aimed at specific evils, but his behavior in
Cantwell and Meadowmoor was intended to strengthen that principle.
Even when the Court dismissed Thornhill as irrelevant in Cox v.
New Hampshire, which sustained licensing of religious parades, he
joined in approving retroactive narrowing of the ordinance in order
to squeeze it under the Cantwell rule. 0 His two main opinions in the
1941 term, moreover, were attempts to bolster public power all the
more.
In Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, an easy case involving a
Jehovah's Witness who cursed a public officer, two restrictive themes
of Thornhill actually dovetailed. Dismissing the claim to free wor-
ship out of hand, Murphy gave vent to some remarkable assumptions
for an "absolutist." Of the free speech claim, he wrote:
Allowing the broadest scope to the language and purpose of the Fourteenth
Amendment, it is well understood that the right of free speech
is not absolute at all times and under all circumstances. There are certain
well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and
punishment of which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional
problem. These include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and
the insulting or "fighting" words-those which by their very utterance
inflict injury or intend to incite an immediate breach of the peace. It has
been well observed that such utterances are no central part of any exposition
of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any
benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social
interest in order and morality.81
Argument was simply unnecessary that these epithets fell into
the class of "fighting words." Yet, what was the difference between
them and the equally provocative insults used by Jehovah's Witnesses
and fringe political groups which the Justice later voted to shelter?
The Chaplinsky opinion, which was considered "well-executed" by
79. Unpublished, first circulated opinion, p. 11, NLRB v. Virginia Elec. & Power
Co., 314 U.S. 469 (1941), No. 25-26, 1941 Term, Box 130; handwritten draft in
Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, supra note 68.
80. Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 578 (1941).
81. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942).
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his colleagues, has been cited frequently in support of less obvious
censorship cases-and rightly so. Murphy's dismissal of certain words
as inherently bad rested on the same assumptions of social value and
of state control which he expressed in Thornhill, which have justi-
fied censors from time immemorial, and which both he and the Court,
in other circumstances, later repudiated. Even though similar
premises reign explicitly in the obscenity field and implicitly else-
where, it was early, not late Murphy that gave them voice.82
No better example of the contrast exists, for all its "pro-labor" over-
tones, than NLRB v. Virginia Electric & Power Co.83 In that case,
which presented the Court's first opportunity to reconcile the first
amendment and the Wagner Act, Justice Murphy was all set to
advance Thornhil's restrictive force. To counter implications that
the rights of workers and employers might differ, his draft opinion
went out of its way to assert that picketing was subject to reasonable
regulation or even outright prohibition as circumstances might re-
quire. Legislation fairly aimed at substantial public evils, he wrote-
"and only so far as the necessities of the case require"-could not be
nullified by the "mere circumstance" that "freedom of utterance is
incidentally and indirectly curtailed." Otherwise, legislative power
to protect any other social interest would be paralyzed. 8 The
message was muffled, however, out of necessity of "massing" the
Court.
The Virginia Electric case, for ample reason, was one of Justice
Murphy's most difficult, ambiguous, and yet important opinions. In
contrast to Thornhill, no consensus existed beyond the general propo-
sition, which he freely expressed, that "language which merges with
conduct does not necessarily place that conduct beyond legislative
reach." Even a clear disagreement as to the facts, which character-
ized Meadowmoor, failed to emerge. Enmeshed with the free speech
question raised by the company's bulletins to its employees were
other issues regarding the agency's findings of company discrimina-
tion as well as its authority to order back wages and the disable-
ment of a company-dominated union. All these issues fragmented the
Court into several directions. Older Justices, such as Stone, who
viewed the facts as close, stumbled at the threshold question of
company domination even before reaching the free speech problem.
Justice Byrnes, who manifested the typical discomforts of a rookie
out of step, was admittedly off-tangent on the wage issue. And a
sharp division developed between Justice Frankfurter and the rest
82. Comment on slip opinion, No. 255, 1941 Term, Box 130. See Kalven, The
Metaphysics of the Law of Obscenity, 1960 SUPREME CoVRT RE v. 1, 9.
83. 314 U.S. 469 (1941).
84. See note 79 supra.
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of Murphy's majority, Justices Black, Reed, and Douglas, regarding
the Board's finding that the company bulletins constituted an unfair
labor practice "on their face."85 The multiplicity of issues meant
that Murphy's task, in contrast to earlier opinions, was not merely to
express a consensus, but to find one-to assemble a majority and to
keep it intact. The inevitable price was sacrifice of his own views.
To Murphy, the problem of reconciling the Thornhill doctrine and
the Wagner Act was not inherently difficult. Distinguishing Thornhill
as a condemnation of blanket prohibitions on speech, he treated the
Virginia Electric problem as simply another example of the exclusion-
ary theme of Thornhill and Cantwell. And leaning heavily on Judge
Learned Hand's analysis of the free speech issue in the Federbush8
case, he wrote a lengthy opinion in support of the Board's judgment,
which Chief Justice Stone and Justice Frankfurter rightfully criticized
for resembling fact-finding rather than judicial review.87
The sticking point was the fact that the NLRB had found the
company bulletins advocating company unionism to be coercive "on
their face." Justice Frankfurter, in a series of incisive memoranda,
objected strenuously to basing the Board order on utterance alone.
Failure to make a specific finding that the utterance was related to
other evidence of coercion, he maintained, meant that an employer
lost his right to speak about unionism merely because of his status
as an employer. Justices Black and Douglas, with whom Murphy
originally agreed, believed no less vigorously that the Board order
was based upon the totality of the company's conduct. "This will
have to be handled deftly," Murphy commented to his clerk after
Justices Frankfurter and Black responded to his request for elaboration
of their views. "It is doubtful that they can be reconciled.""" While
Frankfurter's memoranda appeared to lay the basis of a forceful
dissent, Justice Black and Douglas' position raised difficult issues of
administrative review. As Murphy indicated to Justice Black,
F. F. is right in saying that the Board did single out the bulletin and the
speeches as violations of the Act in and of themselves. You will note that I
admit this but attempted to duck the issue (which I don't like) by saying
that it was part of a complex, adopting a somewhat unrealistic approach. 89
85. Undated conference note; comments on first circulated opinion; note, James F.
Byrnes to FM, undated. Copy, Felix Frankfurter to Hugo L. Black, December 18,
1941, No. 25-26, 1941 Term, Box 130.
86. NLRB v. Federbush Co., 121 F.2d 954 (2d Cir. 1941).
87. See note 78 supra. Harlan F. Stone to FM, Dec. 20, 1941, No. 25-26, 1941 Term,
Box 130.
88. Note, Felix Frankfurter to FM, undated; Copy, Frankfurter to Black, December
18, 1941; memos, FM to clerk, undated, No. 25-26, 1941 Term, Box 130.
89. Memo, Dec. 16, 1941; handwritten note, FM to Hugo L. Black, undated,
No. 25-26, 1941 Term, Box 130.
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His opinion, in other words, considered what the Board omitted.
Since several Justices rejected that procedure, and since the Court
could hardly deny the Board's heavy reliance on the bulletins, Murphy
was caught in a squeeze. The only alternatives were to stick to his
guns that the bulletins alone coerced, thus pushing Hand's theory
to the limit and risking the disintegration of his majority, or to duck
the issue in still another way suggested by Justice Frankfurter and
agreeable to Justices Stone and Byrnes-remanding the case for the
Board's reasoned judgment whether, in context, the bulletins actually
coerced.90
Seeking "to win as many of the Court as possible," Murphy chose
the remand. That option at least made it possible for a united Court
to set the general contours of permissible employer speech, which
was accomplished by borrowing language from both sides. In a
word, utterance which merged with conduct could be considered as
evidence of unfair labor practice, but utterance in isolation could not.
Speech, to be restrained, required consideration in "the surrounding
circumstances."91
But the price of articulating a vague general principle was heavy.
What began as a major personal opportunity to resolve controversial
issues of public policy ended in a substantial capitulation to the views
of Justice Frankfurter and a retreat into obscurity. To assemble a
majority favoring remand, Murphy had to scuttle two-thirds of his
own opinion dealing with the rest of the Board's judgment; and to
justify that remand, he had to obscure what he himself had considered
clear from the start. Remand was necessary, he explained for the
Court, because the record left uncertain whether the Board had con-
sidered the bulletins in context or in isolation. That may have been
true for the Court as a whole, but internal criticism was inescapablethat the result seemed "incoherent and fumbling."92 The Justices
were altering the question into a hypothetical one they had not been
asked; were they also inviting a different conclusion by the Board?
Whereas Thornhill lacked coherence because of Justice Murphy's
own imprecision, in Virginia Electric the Court itself created am-
bivalence, where none existed before, for the sake of half a loaf. For
Murphy, the case was a sobering lesson of the cost of "massing" theJustices to agreement. "If you can get the Court together on this,"
90. Unsigned memo to FM, Dec. 16, 1941; Memos From Harlan F. Stone to
FM, Dec. 18 and 20, 1941; Note From James F. Byrnes to FM, undated, No.
25-26, 1941 Term, Box 130.
91. FM to Hugo L. Black, undated, No. 25-26, 1941 Term, Box 130, 314 U.S.
469, 477-79 (1941).




Justice Byrnes observed nonetheless, "you will render a real service."93
The Supreme Court was beginning to divide unexpectedly and sharply
over the scope of both the first amendment and appellate review.
The Virginia Electric case became an important germ in the develop-
ment of labor law precisely because the Justices were willing to
compromise. In the last analysis, little of principle divided them;
little was lost and much was gained by accepting the requirement
of a reasoned judgment on the part of the Board. As Murphy's clerk
commented when the case returned in 1943: "We did the Board a
service by making it think."9
More important, Meadowmoor and Virginia Electric together went
a long way toward resolving the doubts created by the Thornhill
decision. As applied, they contained a principle that worked both
ways. The NLRB used it to restrain employers' speech in context
of coercion, which was easily established in the parent case; but the
principle also upset a long line of decisions which assumed that
employers had no permissible interest in employee self-organization
issues. Its reasoning permitted lower courts to sustain employer's
speech qua speech, and was eventually frozen into the Taft-Hartley
Act to give a broad statutory guarantee to the employer's right to
communicate. Curiously, Murphy's somewhat ambiguous Virginia
Electric opinion, perhaps for the very reason that it did not pro-
claim the employer's right to speak with dramatic fervor, may have
longer life as a precedent in the development of statutory and case
law controlling labor relations than the sweep of the Thornhill doc-
trine where he started with the Constitution-and from scratch.9 5
The fate of the picketing doctrine, in this respect, was not untypical
of the competing principles which the Court advanced to protect
first amendment freedoms in the 1940's. The Court of that day was
experimenting at the threshold of a great dialogue over personal free-
dom which is not yet resolved. More than the Thornhill doctrine-
for example, the full Carolene rationale or the clear and present
danger test-has since fallen from favor. One of the ironies of the
decade was simultaneous adjudication of first amendment freedoms
by use of inconsistent doctrines. Time was required for the Court's
internal dialogue to harden, and what was true of the institution as
a whole was also true for individual members. The Murphy of the
first two terms was not the Murphy of the Yamashita9 6 Bridges,7
and Eisler98 cases. And if the previous examples have failed to con-
93. Comment on slip opinion, final circulation, No. 25-26, 1941 Term, Box 130.
94. Cert. note, No. 709, 1942 Term, Box 132.
95. Cox, supra note 64, at 785.
96. In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946).
97. Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135 (1945).
98. Eisler v. United States, 338 U.S. 189 (1949).
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vince, the last two from the 1940-41 terms should at least create
doubt.
In Hines v. Davidowitz,99 which preempted the field of alien regis-
tration from state control, Murphy originally voted with the majority
in favor of preemption. But under the badgering of his clerk that
this conclusion conflicted with the Court's stand in commerce cases,
the Justice began to waver toward Justice Stone's position that no
conflict existed.100 Murphy even began to prepare a dissent until
he was persuaded that to do more than join Stone's dissent would be
impolitic. Then, after having criticized Justice Black's "tendency to
spread into the field of policy," he ended where he had started,
convinced that Justice Black's opinion was "exceptionally well
done.' 01
A change of mind in Hines would not have altered the result, but
similar wavering became critical in the Bridges and Times-Mirror
contempt cases, the leading modem cases concerning press inter-
ference with fair trial. Two rights, both ardently believed in, there
collided; and there Justice Murphy became an agonizing "swing-
man." Voting in the fall of 1940 to quash the contempt citation of
Times-Mirror, as his clerk recommended for both cases, Murphy at
the same time voted to approve Harry Bridges' contempt citation
under the admitted influence of Justice Frankfurter's "beautiful state-
ment" in conference defending judicial power to protect fairness of
trial. Towards spring, however, when the opinions were nearing com-
pletion, the Justice began to share his clerk's original doubts whether
the trial judge even had been aware of Bridges' threats, much less
whether they presented a clear and present danger to the trial. Was
the Court forgetting the facts?1
0 2
Justice Frankfurter, of course, believed the record was barren of
such facts, and that no liberty was of greater value than fair trial.
Murphy had no quarrel with that proposition as such, but he queried
its concrete application in a factual setting he regarded as very close.
Fully aware that to retrieve his vote would stalemate the Court after
months of labor and would leave it with no alternative but to order
reargument, he finally wrote Justice Frankfurter: "The still-new robe
never hangs heavier than when my conscience confronts me. Months
of reflection and study compel me to give it voice. And so I have
99. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941).
100. Memos, clerk to FM, Jan. 4, and Jan. 14, 1940; also undated memo, clerk to
FM, No. 22 1940 Term, Box 130.
101. Memos From FM to clerk, undated; comment on slip opinion, No. 22, 1940
Term, Box 130.
102. Bridge v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941). Conference note, undated,
"memorandum on the merits," undated, No. 19-64, 1940 Term, Box 130.
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advised the Chief Justice and Justice Black that my vote.., must be
in reversal." 0
3
So to reverse had deep implications. Reargument in the fall of 1941,
plus Justice Jackson's fresh vote, produced the opposite result. Rever-
sal gave Justice Black an opportunity to write a leading opinion
which, first, significantly reduced the power of state judges to control
the press and, second, significantly advanced the clear and present
danger test as a "working principle" to reconcile competing claims of
liberty and authority. The Justices did not say in so many words
that freedom of expression was "preferred," but the momentum was
plain. Finally, the Bridges case, along with Murphy's first dissent
over the discretion of the NLRB in the Phelps Dodge case, marked
the beginning of a drift in which Justice Murphy, much to his own
surprise, found himself veering from the leadership of Felix Frank-
furter, whom he had assumed would be his spiritual and intellectual
knight, to that of Hugo L. Black.104
The picketing doctrine and the Bridges case inevitably became
exhibits in recurring disputes over the role of the Court in protecting
first amendment freedoms. Their symbolic and doctrinal importance,
however, have tended to obscure both the frequently narrow factual
divisions involved and a pertinent element of the Murphy story. The
truth is that Justice Murphy's views underwent evolution on the
Supreme Court, and the starting point of that evolution was surpris-
ingly hesitant and non-doctrinaire. Murphy might admit, as he did
to Chief Justice Stone in the Bridges case, that "conscience and judg-
ment are inseparable, and the former allows the latter no alterna-
tive."105 He might leave unrebuked his clerk's observation in Hines
that judicial opinions in close cases perforce rationalize policy choices.
But the very instability of his choices as a newcomer, the almost over-
willingness to be persuaded, play havoc with customary explanations
of his behavior, whether expressed by ideological identification or
by the numbers. Justice Murphy as a beginner was not an "activist"
automaton. He was a man of indecision-a man so cross-pressured
by the complexities of choice, as aggravated by his own relations to
it, that he found it difficult to make up his mind. Justice Murphy's
freshman years may have been an extreme case in this respect; but at
a time of ferment over methods of analysis, they support the view
that utility still inheres in the venerable tool of judicial biography.106
103. Note From clerk to FM, undated; FM to Felix Frankfurter, May 29, 1941, No.
19-64, 1940 Term, Box 130.
104. 314 U.S. 252, 263 (1941); Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 200
(1941).
105. FM to Harlan F. Stone, May 29, 1941, No. 19-64, 1940 Term, Box 130.
106. Peltason, Supreme Court Biography and the Study of Public Law, in EssAYs
ox' m ArmucAN CoNsTn oN 215 (Dietze ed. 1964).
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